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Abstract 
 Professional sports teams are important to their local economies, so successful franchises 
are significant contributors to their prosperity. This need for successful teams drives the owners 
and general managers to perform in-depth analyses on potential players to gain insight, so the 
best players can be chosen. Major League Baseball is one of the largest sports leagues in the 
world, so their analysis of players must be excellent to ensure they sign the best players and can 
compete at a high level.  
 Baseball is a complex sport with many different statistics evaluating nearly every part of 
a player’s game. Because of its complexity, professional baseball relies on statistics more than 
any of the other professional sports. General managers and scouts for teams analyze players 
using a variety of statistics, so ensuring current statistics that meet their needs are available is 
vital. Continuously updating and developing new statistics is extremely important to keep 
professional baseball near the top of the professional sports world. This analysis develops a new 
offensive statistic for use by MLB teams when they consider what players to sign during free 
agency. The approach used attempts to improve an existing statistic then combines the improved 
statistic with another statistic to gain a new perspective on player analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Major League Baseball (MLB) is the largest professional baseball league and the second 
largest sports league in the world with over $10 billion in gross revenues in 2017 (Brown, 2017). 
Because of the scope and importance of the league to the local economies, it is important for 
teams to be well informed in their analysis of players. An important tool used by teams for 
analyses is statistics. Using statistics, teams analyze batters based not only on how well they hit, 
but also their ability to avoid getting out (Hakes & Sauer, 2006). The statistics, ranging from 
simple to very complex, have not always been valued like they are today. In the middle of the 
20th century, Branch Rickey was the first baseball executive to find value in statistics when 
organizing his teams. He was a pioneer in baseball who created formulas that disproved myths 
and proved what really wins (Rickey, 1954). Rickey’s ideas set the tone for what would come 
half a century later. 
Two ways that teams acquire players are through free agency and through trading with 
other teams. Free agency is when teams make decisions regarding which players without current 
contracts to sign. Trading is when teams exchange players or other resources such as cash or 
future draft picks. Both trades and free agency decisions are risky because baseball is a very 
unpredictable sport that allows the lesser-skilled teams to win on any given day (Jia, Wong, & 
Zeng, 2013). MLB teams are always trying to gain an advantage in determining which players 
will benefit their team the most. Winning games is the ultimate goal in baseball, so choosing 
players who will help accomplish this is imperative. With the constant evolution of statistics to 
try to determine the most effective measures for player analysis, experimentation of new metrics 
to obtain a different perspective of players is important to develop the game for the future. The 
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research I conducted aimed to first formulate a new statistic based on currently used metrics in 
an effort to improve how players are analyzed and second, to formulate a new statistic combining 
the first one I created and an existing one to find a new method for teams to evaluate free agent  
players they might like to sign. 
2. Literature Review 
 At some level, statistics have always been measured in baseball. In baseball, statistics can 
be divided into two different categories: counting and rate. Counting statistics measure a player’s 
total production without addressing how many plate appearances they have. On the other hand, 
rate statistics are calculated by taking the number of successes a player has by the number of 
opportunities (Use of Statistics, 2016). The use of statistics began with easy to quantify counting 
statistics such as home runs, and innings pitched. As baseball has grown on the national scale, 
the need for better statistical analyses has become necessary. In the 1970s, Bill James became 
one of the first people to analyze baseball players using in-depth statistics. James coined the term 
“sabermetrics” to define the analysis he was doing. James defined sabermetrics as “the search for 
objective knowledge about baseball” (Birnbaum). Sabermetrics was the beginning of 
development of many new rate statistics as well as a few, more complex, counting statistics. 
The boom of sabermetrics sparked the interest of more people than just the few involved 
with Bill James’ research. The desire to learn the most effective ways to identify the best players 
eventually moved onto a larger scale when the Oakland Athletics (A’s) proposed the idea of 
Moneyball. Because all MLB teams do not have the same budget, the ability to analyze players 
effectively is especially important for less wealthy teams. The A’s were the first team to prove 
how crucial statistical analysis is in baseball. The A’s are a small market team, so their budget is 
not as large as other teams. Despite having either the lowest or second-lowest payroll in the 
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MLB for consecutive seasons, the A’s fielded teams that were competitive with the teams with 
the highest payrolls (Lewis, 2003). The general manager of the A’s, Billy Beane, realized the 
competitive disadvantage his team faced, so he became more creative in his analysis of players. 
The concept of Moneyball based the analysis of players on statistics not valued as highly by 
other teams such as on base percentage to sign free agents’ or trade for players other teams 
overlooked. 
 Batting average has always been the statistic that is the most popular among casual 
baseball fans because of how easy it is to calculate and how clearly it impacts the game. Batting 
average is calculated by dividing the number of hits for a player by the number of at bats they 
have. It is important to note that walks and hit-by-pitch are not included in this calculation. 
Hitters who have high batting averages consistently reach base via a hit. The players who are 
viewed as being the best typically have one of, if not, the highest batting averages. Table 1 
shown below describes the statistics that are most important to my research. These statistics are 
used to calculate more advanced statistics such as batting average. 
Table 1: Common batting statistics 
Hit (H) When a batter hits a ball into fair territory and 
reached base safely without an error or 
fielder’s choice. 
Walk (BB) When a pitcher throws four balls outside the 
zone and the hitter does not swing at any of 
them. The batter is awarded first base. Walks 
do not count as an at-bat. 
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Hit-by-pitch (HBP) When a batter is struck by a pitched ball 
without swinging at it. Hit-by-pitch 
occurrences do not count as an at-bat. 
At Bat (AB) When a batter reaches base via a fielder’s 
choice, hit, or an error, or when a batter is put 
out on a non-sacrifice. 
Plate Appearance (PA) When a batter completes a turn at the plate. 
Sacrifice Fly (SF) When a batter hits a fly-ball out to the outfield 
or foul territory that allows a runner to score. 
Sacrifice Bunt (SH) When a batter successfully advances one or 
more runners by bunting the ball for an out. 
Error (E) When a fielder fails to make a play that the 
official scorer judges an average fielder 
would have made. 
Run (R) When a runner crosses the plate safely to 
score. 
Stolen Base (SB) When a runner takes a base to which they 
aren’t entitled. 
Caught Stealing (CS) When a runner is thrown out trying to steal a 
base. 
Intentional Walk (IBB) When a batter is walked on purpose. 
Strikeout (K) When a hitter swings or looks at the third 
strike of their at-bat. 
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Like batting average, On-base percentage (OBP) is another statistic used to measure 
player performance. As its name indicates, OBP measures how often a player gets on base 
divided by the total number of plate appearances the player has. It considers all plate appearances 
resulting in a hit, walk, or hit-by-pitch as positively affecting the value and all other plate 
appearances as negatively affecting the value. Errors negatively affect OBP even though the 
player did reach base safely. OBP is calculated using the formula below. Even though the 
importance of OBP is not as widely recognized by casual baseball fans, it is a very important 
statistic for small market MLB teams such as the A’s. OBP allows teams to compete despite a 
low batting average because of their ability to get on base. 
 
On Base Percentage = 
Hits+Walks+Hit by Pitch
At bats+Sacrifice Flies+Walks+Hit by Pitch
 
  
 OBP was made immensely more popular by Moneyball. Getting on base more often 
causes multiple problems for the opposing defense. It not only provides the team a chance to 
score, but it also affects the pitcher’s pitching motion as well as the defensive alignment (Lewis, 
2003). Pitchers also are forced to throw more pitches, so they may become tired more quickly. 
These differences in the defense put more pressure on them and give the team on offense a better 
chance to score than simply having the runner on base. 
Slugging percentage (SLG) is another statistic used to evaluate players. This statistic 
measures a player’s ability to hit for power. Slugging percentage favors players who get more 
doubles, triples, and home runs known as extra base hits because these types of hits are worth 
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more total bases per at-bat. This metric is measured on a scale from 0.000 – 4.000 with a higher 
value representing a better player.  
 
Slugging percentage = 
Total Bases
At Bats
 
 
On-base plus slugging (OPS) is a statistic combining OBP and SLG. OPS is used to 
determine hitters who are well-rounded. A higher OPS indicates a player who is good at both 
hitting for power and getting on base. The formula for OPS is shown below. 
 
OPS = OBP + SLG 
 
 While OPS is an interesting statistic that is fairly effective at evaluating players, it is not 
without its flaws. This statistic treats OBP and SLG as equal statistics in the calculation, but this 
equal treatment does not fairly analyze players (Slowinski, 2010). This unequal treatment was 
discussed in The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball. In this book, the authors explain 
how calculating OPS using a 1.7 multiplier for OBP makes sense because of how much more 
value it provides to the statistic (Tango, Lichtman, & Dolphin, 2007). My research aims to 
explore an alternate way to account for the added value OBP adds to the statistic by taking the 
current SLG formula and giving weight to walks. Walks are only given value currently in the 
OBP formula, so adding them to the SLG formula will help even out the disparity in how much 
value should be given to SLG and OBP when calculating OPS. 
 Bill James developed a new statistic to help evaluate players in more depth than just OPS 
as well. His statistic, runs created (RC), is used to predict how many runs a player or team will 
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create based on their hitting statistics. Runs created allows teams to analyze players by seeing 
how much they would contribute to their team if they signed them. This statistic is especially 
important because it focuses on runs scored which is the goal of the offense in baaseball. 
Rob Mains conducted a study of every team from 1914 to 2015 to see what the 
relationship was between runs per game, SLG, OBP, OPS, and BA (Mains, 2016). The results of 
his study are in Table 2 below. This table shows OPS is clearly the best indicator for runs scored 
by a team. Because the correlation coefficient is not perfect, my goal is to create a statistic that is 
even closer to the optimal value of 1.0. 
Table 2: Rob Mains Correlation Results 
Correlation Test Correlation Coefficient 
Runs per game vs. OBP 0.890 
Runs per game vs. SLG 0.867 
Runs per game vs. OPS 0.944 
Runs per game vs. BA 0.812 
 
Even though currently used statistics do a good job of measuring player performance, 
purely evaluating players by weighting each plate appearance equally does not seem fair. This is 
where situational hitting comes into play. Whether a player hits a home run in the first inning of 
a regular season game or in the ninth inning of Game 7 of the World Series, its statistical 
significance is the same. Situational hitting is a very important quality to teams. Hitters that are 
categorized as being more “clutch” are more attractive to teams because they perform better in 
high leverage situations. The abilities these players possess do not significantly change when 
presented with situations where they are required to be “clutch”, so they are sought after when 
12 
 
building rosters. “Clutchness” is a newer statistic being measured. The measure assigns in-game 
situations a leverage index value and assesses players based on their performance in higher 
leverage situations. If they perform at or below their normal averages on any given statistic, they 
are said to not be very clutch. However, if they perform better in high leverage situations than 
they do in “normal” situations, they are clutch. Using the statistics previously mentioned, my 
research analyzes the best players and attempts to connect “clutchness“ to the newly developed 
statistic.  
To connect “clutchness” to the statistic, I researched how often a player bats in a “clutch” 
situation on average. David Appleman writes about the leverage index which defines how 
important a particular situation in a game is based on different measures. In his article, he 
mentions that around 10% of all situations have a leverage index above 2 which indicates these 
situations are the highest leverage. This leverage index is used to create the currently existing 
clutch statistic on Fangraphs website.  
For my research, I will use the statistic that is already developed to build an overall 
statistic that measures a player’s ability to perform in both “clutch” and “normal” situations. A 
detailed breakdown of the components of this statistic will be included in the methodology 
section below. This new statistic can be used alongside currently existing statistics such as OPS 
and batting average to give teams a different perspective on a certain player. 
3. Methodology 
 This research project is broken down into three distinct phases: preliminary analysis, new 
statistical formulation, and comparative analysis. The primary software I used for performing the 
analysis was Excel. I used it to run correlations create new formulas and analyze the data for the 
comparative analysis. 
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3.1 Preliminary Analysis 
 The first phase is the initial data analysis phase. In this phase, I looked at currently used 
statistics and identified how well they currently operate and the players who are the best using 
the respective statistics. The insights gained from this initial analysis helped us better understand 
the relationship between each of the statistics of interest and the players that performed the best 
when analyzed using them. 
 “Clutchness” was the main statistic I investigated. To see which players were doing well 
in this category, I gathered data from the previous twenty seasons on all qualifying players. A 
qualifying player is simply a player who averages 3.1 plate appearances per game. This 
eliminates players who do not play as much from being rewarded for it. The data I gathered 
included the “clutchness” data as well as data on the batting average, slugging percentage, OPS, 
and other frequently used statistics. I ran correlations on this data to see if there was any 
relationship between “clutchness” and any of the other statistics of interest to me. Table 3 shows 
the results of the analysis. 
Table 3: Clutchness vs. Common Statistics Correlation Results 
Comparison Correlation Coefficient 
Clutchness vs. OBP 0.04466 
Clutchness vs. SLG -0.03528 
Clutchness vs. OPS -0.00668 
Clutchness vs. BA 0.07075 
  
 This analysis showed exactly what I was expecting to see. The overall abilities of a player 
do not necessarily affect how clutch they are. This proves how important evaluating “clutchness” 
is. Just because a player performs well in 90% of the situations they face, does not mean they 
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will perform well in high leverage situations. This initial analysis suggests creating a statistic 
using “clutchness” could be useful for analyzing player performance. 
3.2 New Statistic Formulation 
 In the second phase, I altered one of the currently used statistics, OPS. The goal of the 
new statistic which I will call OPS* is to see if I could create a new statistic that more closely 
reflects a team’s ability to score runs. When formulating the new statistic, I created four basic 
variations to implement different aspects of a player’s performance. All variations of the statistic 
are very similar to OPS, but they add more complexity to the formula. Each of the variations was 
used to find the correlation between it and runs scored to see if an improvement from the original 
OPS formula was found. 
The first, most basic variations were created to evaluate each of the statistics separately. 
Each of the statistics of interest (BB, HBP, IBB, SB) were plugged into the base slugging 
formula shown below. This formula was then added to the existing OBP formula to form the new 
OPS statistic. 
 
SLG Alternative = 
Total Bases + Candidate
At Bats + Candidate
 
 
OPS Alternative = OBP + SLG Alternative 
 
The first variation shown below gives more weight to walks in the slugging percentage 
formula. This extra weight is given to try to even out the apparent difference in weight between 
OBP and SLG. The formula for the statistic is shown below. 
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SLG* = 
Total Bases + BB
At Bats + BB
 
 
OPS* = OBP + SLG* 
 
The second variation gives more weight to HBP in the slugging percentage formula. Like 
the formula using walks, this formula was developed to give players credit for earning their way 
on base. Even though all players do not intentionally try to get hit, some players will crowd the 
plate each at bat and the addition of this statistic rewards them for their actions. The formula for 
the variation is shown below.  
 
SLG$ = 
Total Bases + HBP
At Bats + HBP
 
 
OPS$ = OBP + SLG$ 
  
 The third variation accounts for intentional walks. Intentional walks are weighed 
separately from non-intentional walks because they are not “earned” in the same way. Intentional 
walks only occur in certain in-game situations, but I believed it was important to include them in 
the analysis because better players are typically intentionally walked more. The variation is 
shown below. 
 
SLG^ = 
Total Bases + IBB
At Bats + IBB
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OPS^ = OBP + SLG^ 
 
 The next variation gives weight to stolen bases. This rewards faster players who bring 
added pressure to the pitcher and catcher because of their ability to essentially stretch their hit 
into a higher value hit by stealing a base. However, they will also be penalized for being caught 
stealing. The formula for this variation is shown below. 
 
SLG' = 
Total Bases + SB - CS
At Bats
 
 
OPS' = OBP + SLG' 
 
The final basic variation was designed to negatively affect players who strikeout often. 
Strikeouts do not provide any advantages to the team because the ball is not put in play. Putting 
the ball in play forces the other team to make a play and the possibility of reaching base or 
advancing a runner who is already on base increases. In 2019, the total number of strikeouts 
record was broken again just as it had been in each of the previous fourteen seasons. In the 
current era of baseball, players value the homerun more highly than ever, but with this greater 
effort to hit more homeruns often comes at the expense of more strikeouts. Because of this 
number continuing to climb, including a formula for strikeouts was necessary. To find the exact 
weight for what each strikeout should be worth, a sensitivity analysis was performed. The goal of 
this analysis was to get the best correlation value versus runs scored. The results of this analysis 
are discussed in the results section. The strikeouts formula is shown below.  
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SLG# = 
Total Bases - 0.07(K)
At Bats
 
 
OPS# = OBP + SLG# 
 
 Once the initial analysis of each of the five candidate statistics were performed, the 
potential contributors to a final improved statistic were identified and this statistic was built. 
Variations with all possible combinations of the chosen statistics were formulated to find the 
final one. The final variation shown below includes stolen bases, walks, and strikeouts. The 
results of the experimentation to find this statistic are in the results section. 
 
SLG! = 
Total Bases + SB - CS + BB - 0.07(K)
At Bats + BB
 
 
OPS! = OBP + SLG! 
 
After the final variation of OPS was created, a new formula was created to evaluate the 
overall value of a player. This statistic combines the final OPS variation with the clutch statistic 
currently used. I called this statistic an Integrated Measure of Performance (IMP). This new 
statistic aims to evaluate a player’s overall value for all situations. It gives a much greater weight 
to OPS! because this statistic describes a player’s performance in any situation. Teams care more 
about a player’s performance in general. For this statistic, I gave clutch situations a 10 percent 
weight and all other situations a 90 percent weight because most players find themselves in high 
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level “clutch” situations roughly 10 percent of the time. The statistic I formulated is shown 
below. 
 
 IMP = 0.1 * Clutch + 0.9 * OPS! 
 
3.3 Analysis 
 Finally, a two-part analysis was performed. The first part compared OPS with the 
multiple variations of the new statistic. This analysis was a process that occurred during and 
following the new statistical formulation phase. The first part of the analysis involved a 
correlation between the OPS variations and runs scored just as Rob Mains performed. For my 
research, I only used the data from the last 30 years instead of the more than one hundred 
seasons he used.  
 The second part of the analysis evaluated the IMP. I first looked at how the IMP changed 
over a player’s career. Because I had data from the last twenty seasons, I evaluated players who 
began their careers in the early 2000s for this analysis. I also looked at how the IMP rated 
players and compared this rating to their finish in the Most Valuable Player (MVP) race and their 
Wins Above Replacement (WAR) total for the season. WAR is used to summarize a player’s 
total contribution to their team into one statistic (Slowinski, 2010). WAR is known to be a very 
good statistic for determining how good a player is at a specific aspect of the game. WAR is 
divided into three different categories: Batting Runs, Base Running Runs, and Fielding Runs. For 
the purposes of our study, I will only be considering their batting runs because I did not look at 
fielding, and base running runs involves much more than just stolen bases. 
19 
 
4. Results 
 The results are divided into two sections: the results for the new statistical formulation 
and the results from the analysis of the IMP. 
4.1 New Statistic Formulation  
 After doing the preliminary analysis using the existing statistics, I began the next phase 
of developing the new statistic. I first ran baseline correlations to see how well the existing SLG 
and OPS statistics predict runs scored. The data I used for these correlations spanned the last 30 
seasons and included statistics for all teams in the league. After I had established the baseline, I 
began experimenting with the different statistics to see if I could improve on the SLG and OPS 
statistics. 
 I began by looking at each of the candidate statistics separately to see if they improved 
the correlation by themselves. The full tables of correlations are shown in Tables 4 and 5. I will 
now discuss each of the individual statistics and analyze the results of their testing.  
 The first addition to the statistic was walks. Because walks occur frequently and earning 
them has the potential to advance runners, it was no surprise that the SLG statistic improved 
significantly, and the OPS statistic improved slightly.  
 Next, I analyzed the impact of HBP. HBP is similar to walks in that it has the potential to 
advance runners, but because they do not occur as frequently, it is not surprising to see that it did 
not make the OPS or the SLG statistic any better. 
 I then looked at the intentional walks to see their impact. In a game, intentional walks are 
usually only given in situations where runners will not advance or high leverage situations. For 
this reason, it is not surprising that the OPS statistic did not improve. However, intentional walks 
did improve the SLG statistic because they are like walks and HBPs in that they runner reaches 
base safely. 
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 Net stolen bases was the next statistic I investigated. Because players who steal bases are 
stretching their hit into essentially a hit that is worth one more base, it is not surprising that 
stolen bases help predict runs score more effectively in both formulas. 
 The final statistic was strikeouts. To find the final version of this formula that I wanted to 
use, I performed a sensitivity analysis with different percentages to subtract for each strikeout. 
After the analysis, I settled on seven percent for every strikeout because it created the OPS# 
value closest to the optimal value of 1.0. This formula proved to be effective for both SLG and 
OPS because as I mentioned earlier, runners cannot be advanced when a player strikes out, so 
strikeouts do not help score runs. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the correlations. Figures 1 
and 2 represent correlation plots showing Runs vs. SLG + BB and Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + 
HBP). The other correlation plots showing the results of these tests are shown in Figures 7-16 in 
the Appendix. 
Table 4: Runs vs. Base Slugging Alternatives Correlation Results 
SLG Alternative Correlation Correlation Coefficient 
Runs vs. SLG 0.90067 
 
Runs vs. SLG + BB 0.93084 
Runs vs. SLG + HBP 0.89673 
Runs vs. SLG + IBB 0.90482 
Runs vs. SLG + SB 0.90518 
Runs vs. SLG – 0.1K 0.91492 
Runs vs. SLG – 0.15K 0.91810 
Runs vs. SLG – 0.05K 0.90913 
 
Runs vs. SLG – 0.07K 0.91176 
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Table 5: Runs vs. Base OPS Alternatives Correlation Results 
OPS Alternative Correlation Correlation Coefficient 
Runs vs. OPS 0.95253 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB) 0.95470 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + HBP) 0.95092 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + IBB) 0.95189 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + SB) 0.95393 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.1K) 0.95347 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.15K) 0.95213 
 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.05K) 0.95361 
 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.07K) 0.95370 
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Figure 1: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/BB 
 
Figure 2: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/HBP 
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 The combined final statistic showed improvement from the existing OPS statistic, but not 
by very much. Because the existing statistic is already an excellent predictor of runs scored, there 
was not much room for improvement. Tables 6 and 7 show the correlation for the slugging 
percentage and OPS of each variation of the final statistic. They show that each of the 
combinations of two of the three best predictors were very good, but the one that was chosen at 
the end was the one combining all three. A plot of the final OPS correlation is also shown in 
Figure 3, and all other correlation plots for SLG! and OPS! are in the Appendix as Figures 17-23. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Runs vs. SLG! Alternatives Correlation Results 
SLG! Alternatives Correlation Correlation Coefficient 
Runs vs. SLG + BB + SB – CS 0.93371 
 
Runs vs. SLG + BB – 0.07K 0.94026 
 
Runs vs. SLG + SB – CS – 0.07K 0.91514 
 
Runs vs. SLG + BB + SB – CS – 0.07K 0.94452 
 
Table 7: Runs vs. OPS! Alternatives Correlation Results 
OPS! Alternatives Correlation Correlation Coefficient 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB + SB - CS) 0.95574 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB – 0.07K) 0.95560 
 
Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + SB – CS - 0.07K) 0.95464 
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Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB + SB – CS - 0.07K) 0.95624 
 
 
Figure 3: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB + BB - K 
 
4.2 IMP Evaluation 
 After the final variation of OPS was formulated, I began to formulate the IMP. The goal 
of the IMP was to create an overall statistic to evaluate players just as Bill James did with his 
runs created (RC) statistic. For each of the last five seasons, tables showing the top 10 players 
according to our IMP were created. Table 8 shows the 2019 leaders. The rest of the tables are in 
the appendix as Tables 16-19. 
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Table 8: 2019 IMP Leaders 
Player IMP 
Christian Yelich 1.100 
Matt Olson 1.067 
Xander Bogaerts 1.017 
Anthony Rendon 1.014 
Bryce Harper 1.004 
Anthony Rizzo 0.995 
Mookie Betts 0.989 
Michael Brantley 0.985 
Max Muncy 0.985 
Charlie Blackmon 0.971 
 
 Just like in every other sport, MLB players’ abilities regress as they get older. This 
affects how well they perform in each of the main statistical categories. I decided to investigate 
how players typically regress according to the IMP I developed. I looked at a few players who 
began their careers in the early 2000s such as Albert Pujols, and I analyzed their regression over 
time. The three players I investigated, Albert Pujols, David Ortiz, and Carlos Beltran, showed 
different patterns in their IMP scores. Overall, all three players showed a few seasons where they 
peaked, then a gradual decline occurred. This was most noticeable in Albert Pujols. David Ortiz 
decline was less dramatic because he had seasons at the end of his career where he had much 
higher numbers than the surrounding seasons. Figure 4 shows the results of this analysis. Figure 
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5 also shows the same players’ results for OPS over the same time period. The OPS analysis 
shows more of a gradual decline and no clear peak for the players like there was in the IMP. The 
peak in the IMP appears as though it was only caused by the players having peak “clutchness” 
years at the same time they were having good OPS seasons as shown by Figure 6. The 
underlying statistics for these analyses are shown in Tables 36-38 in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 4: Graph Showing IMP Values Over Time 
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Figure 5: Graph Showing OPS Values Over Time 
 
Figure 6: Graph Showing Clutchness Values Over Time 
 
 An analysis of how the top players ranked according to MVP voting and WAR was the 
final analysis of the IMP I created. For each of the last twenty seasons, I gathered the top five 
position players according to WAR total and the top five finishers in the MVP race. I then 
compared where they finished according to the IMP score. The goal of this comparison was for 
the sum of the rankings to be less than 50. This would mean that all five players on average were 
in the top 10 of the IMP ranking system. However, after looking at the results of this analysis, it 
appears as though the statistic I have developed is not a good predictor of who the MVP should 
be. For some seasons, the results did come out close to what I was hoping they would, but for 
others, they were very far off because at least one of the players was extremely “unclutch”.   
 I did not want to come to this conclusion based solely upon one or two bad seasons, so I 
continued investigating. I consistently found the results to be outside the desired range. Out of 
the ten separate races tested, only three qualified as being acceptable. The two tables below show 
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the MVP races from two different seasons. Table 9 shows a fairly normal race where all the 
players placed moderately high in the IMP ranking, and their total ranking barely met the 
minimum requirement. Table 10 shows one of the extreme seasons where two of the players 
were extremely “unclutch”, so the overall IMP ranking was more than three times the desired 
outcome. The rest of the IMP Ranking Tables are shown as Tables 20-27 in the Appendix. For 
each of the tables, the order of finish for the MVP voting is the same as the order the players are 
listed in the table. 
Table 9: 2017 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Giancarlo Stanton 22 
Joey Votto 5 
Paul Goldschmidt 30 
Nolan Arenado 1 
Charlie Blackmon 7 
Total 65 
 
Table 10: 2017 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking Table 
Player IMP Ranking 
Jose Altuve 14 
Aaron Judge 65 
Jose Ramirez 74 
Mike Trout 4 
Francisco Lindor 7 
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Total 164 
 Whenever I evaluated the players according to their WAR total for the season, the results 
were not much different than the MVP results. In general, players who have a higher WAR are 
better, so the media typically votes them at the top of the MVP race. Due to this, a maximum of 
only one or two players out of the top five changed from MVP to WAR for each of the seasons I 
analyzed. A table showing the WAR totals for the NL and AL in 2019 are shown below. There is 
only one player different from the MVP race above in both leagues, so the total is worse for both, 
but in general these changes did not affect the total significantly. Tables 11 and 12 show how the 
WAR leaders for both leagues did in our IMP Rankings for the 2019 season. The rest of the 
tables showing the results of this analysis are Tables 28-35 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 11: 2019 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Christian Yelich 1 
Ketel Marte 21 
Cody Bellinger 14 
Anthony Rendon 2 
Pete Alonso 22 
Total 60 
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Table 12: 2019 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mike Trout 7 
Alex Bregman 14 
Marcus Semien 31 
Xander Bogaerts 2 
Rafael Devers 26 
Total 80 
  
 I also created a table to analyze the top 20 players in five different categories of interest 
for my research. In Table 13, the leaders for each of five categories are shown. For the first three 
categories, the top players are not undervalued by teams. OPS and offensive WAR are well-
known among the decision makers, and OPS! is not a huge variation from OPS, so their analysis 
using it would probably not change too much. The last two columns show statistics that would 
not be at the top of the list for general managers when they analyze players. The IMP showed six 
players who did not appear on any of the three main lists, so they may be undervalued. One 
player, Matt Olson, was even rated as the second-best player according to my IMP. Using the 
IMP to analyze players could allow teams to sign them at much lower cost. Finding these players 
was the one of the main goals I had when I created this statistic. 
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Table 13: 2019 Offensive Leaders 
OPS OPS! oWAR Clutchness IMP Normalized IMP 
Christian Yelich Christian Yelich Mike Trout Matt Olson Christian Yelich Christian Yelich 
Mike Trout Mike Trout Alex Bregman Alex Gordon Matt Olson Mike Trout 
Cody Bellinger Cody Bellinger Marcus Semien Jose Iglesias Xander Bogaerts Anthony Rendon 
Nelson Cruz Alex Bregman Christian Yelich Michael Brantley Anthony Rendon Cody Bellinger 
Alex Bregman Anthony Rendon Xander Bogaerts Jean Segura Bryce Harper Alex Bregman 
Anthony Rendon Nelson Cruz Cody Bellinger Matt Chapman Anthony Rizzo Nelson Cruz 
Ketel Marte Juan Soto Ketel Marte Bryce Harper Mookie Betts Mookie Betts 
George Springer Ketel Marte Anthony Rendon Shin-Soo Choo Michael Brantley Xander Bogaerts 
Nolan Arenado George Springer Rafael Devers Kevin Newman Max Muncy Juan Soto 
Juan Soto Nolan Arenado Pete Alonso Xander Bogaerts Charlie Blackmon Anthony Rizzo 
Pete Alonso Mookie Betts Jorge Polanco Adam Frazier Freddie Freeman Freddie Freeman 
Charlie Blackmon Freddie Freeman Mookie Betts Evan Longoria Ronald Acuna Jr. Nolan Arenado 
Xander Bogaerts Carlos Santana DJ LeMahieu Max Muncy Shin-Soo Choo George Springer 
J.D. Martinez Xander Bogaerts George Springer David Fletcher Trea Turner Ketel Marte 
Freddie Freeman Anthony Rizzo Yoan Moncada Wilson Ramos Matt Chapman Bryce Harper 
Josh Bell J.D. Martinez Nolan Arenado Anthony Rizzo Nolan Arenado Carlos Santana 
Eugenio Suarez Josh Bell Trevor Story Charlie Blackmon Kris Bryant Max Muncy 
Anthony Rizzo Pete Alonso Juan Soto Trea Turner Mike Trout Matt Olson 
Austin Meadows Trevor Story Ronald Acuna Jr. Ronald Acuna Jr. Bryan Reynolds Ronald Acuna Jr. 
Jorge Soler Josh Donaldson Matt Chapman Paul Goldschmidt Carlos Santana Charlie Blackmon 
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 After I ran the analysis on the IMP, I realized that normalizing the “clutchness” part of 
the IMP had the potential make the statistic better. Because most players have OPS scores 
between 0 and 1 while the range for clutchness is typically -2 to 2. Because the formula treats 
them like they are the same, the analysis made it seem as though a normalization would make the 
formula better. Normalizing “clutchness” will create a more fair balance of “clutchness” and 
day-to-day performance. When I normalized “clutchness” by dividing it by two, the resulting 
correlation coefficient versus runs scored was 0.31414. I then normalized it again by dividing 
“clutchness” by four. The resulting correlation coefficient versus runs scored was 0.50938. Both 
of these values being closer to the optimal value of 1.0 indicate that normalization may be a 
better process for developing this statistic. Further sensitivity analysis could be done in the future 
to improve the statistic. Table 14 shows the 2019 players rankings according to the second 
normalization and compares the rankings to the original IMP. This table ranks the higher ranked 
OPS! and WAR players much higher than the original IMP. 
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Table 14: 2019 Normalized IMP Leaders 
Player Normalized IMP Original IMP Ranking 
Christian Yelich 1.072 1 
Mike Trout 1.004 18 
Anthony Rendon 0.968 4 
Cody Bellinger 0.959 24 
Alex Bregman 0.947 31 
Nelson Cruz 0.933 21 
Mookie Betts 0.916 7 
Xander Bogaerts 0.915 3 
Juan Soto 0.911 28 
Anthony Rizzo 0.909 6 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Baseball is a continuously evolving game. Players change their approaches frequently to 
gain an advantage. These nuances are what make baseball so unique. Every player plays the 
game differently, so new statistics are being created frequently to evaluate players according to 
their specifications. The performance measure I created can be used to look at players in a 
different way than they previously have been. Combining regular and clutch performance gives 
teams a new way to look at players. 
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Table 14 shows the correlation values for each of the main overall offensive statistics used. 
WAR is clearly the best, and the new OPS statistic created is the second best. While the IMP is 
not very good at predicting runs scored, it can still be used alongside other statistics to evaluate 
the situational capabilities of players and to find players who may be undervalued. 
 The normalized IMP rating system would be a better rating system for MLB players. The 
normalization gives less value to “clutchness”, so while more of the best players will still be at 
the top of the rankings, some undervalued players will still be shown because of their “clutch” 
ability. 
Table 15: Runs vs. Offensive Statistics 
Correlation Correlation Coefficient 
Runs scored vs. OPS 0.95259 
Runs scored vs. OPS! 0.95356 
 
Runs scored vs. WAR 0.99180 
Runs scored vs. IMP 0.197823 
Runs scored vs. Normalized IMP 0.50938 
  
6. Future Work 
 This research can be furthered by finding an even better statistic to predict runs scored or 
to better predict another measure of player performance and make the baseball statistics field 
even better. The analysis showed that adding the “clutchness” statistic made some players much 
better and some much worse. Finding the balance between OPS! and “clutchness” for the IMP I 
created could make this an even more useful statistic. The normalization process I did after the 
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rest of my analysis had been completed should be further investigated through a sensitivity 
analysis to find this balance.  
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8. Appendices 
 
 
Figure 7: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG 
 
 
Figure 8: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/HBP 
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Figure 9: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/IBB 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB 
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Figure 11: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/K 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS 
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Figure 13: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/BB 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/IBB 
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Figure 15: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/SB 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/K 
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Figure 17: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB + BB 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/BB - K 
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Figure 19: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB - K 
 
 
 
   
Figure 20: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB + BB - K 
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Figure 21: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/SB + BB 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/BB - K 
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Figure 23: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/SB – K 
 
Table 16: 2018 IMP Leaders 
Player IMP 
Alex Bregman 1.040 
Mookie Betts 1.026 
Xander Bogaerts 0.997 
Andrew Benintendi 0.989 
J.D. Martinez 0.984 
Christian Yelich 0.938 
Gregory Polanco 0.935 
Nelson Cruz 0.920 
Brian Anderson 0.893 
Manny Machado 0.884 
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Table 17: 2017 IMP Leaders 
Player IMP 
Nolan Arenado 1.042 
Marwin Gonzales 1.025 
Anthony Rizzo 0.989 
Cody Bellinger 0.981 
Mookie Better 0.976 
George Springer 0.953 
Mike Trout 0.945 
Joe Mauer 0.933 
Jake Lamb 0.924 
Joey Votto 0.920 
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Table 18: 2016 IMP Leaders 
Player IMP 
Adrian Beltre 1.003 
Mike Trout 0.962 
Jose Ramirez 0.957 
Joey Votto 0.947 
Dustin Pedroia 0.945 
Bryce Harper 0.943 
Charlie Blackmon 0.936 
Elvis Andrus 0.910 
Paul Goldschmidt 0.908 
Yoenis Cespedes 0.905 
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Table 19: 2015 IMP Leaders 
Player IMP 
Anthony Rizzo 1.028 
Miguel Cabrera 1.027 
Andrew McCutchen 1.016 
Eric Hosmer 1.013 
Matt Carpenter 0.994 
Lorenzo Cain 0.991 
Kris Bryant 0.987 
Paul Goldschmidt 0.986 
Mitch Moreland 0.957 
Carlos Gonzalez 0.957 
 
Table 20: 2019 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Cody Bellinger 14 
Christian Yelich 1 
Anthony Rendon 2 
Ketel Marte 21 
Ronald Acuna Jr. 8 
Total 46 
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Table 21: 2019 AL MVP IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mike Trout 7 
Alex Bregman 14 
Marcus Semien 31 
DJ LeMahieu 13 
Xander Bogaerts 2 
Total 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22: 2018 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Christian Yelich 1 
Javier Baez 26 
Nolan Arenado 12 
Freddie Freeman 24 
Paul Goldschmidt 5 
Total 68 
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Table 23: 2018 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mookie Betts 2 
Mike Trout 12 
Jose Ramirez 24 
J.D. Martinez 5 
Alex Bregman 1 
Total 44 
 
 
 
Table 24: 2016 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Kris Bryant 55 
Daniel Murphy 20 
Corey Seager 47 
Anthony Rizzo 9 
Nolan Arenado 6 
Total 137 
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Table 25: 2016 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mike Trout 2 
Mookie Betts 15 
Jose Altuve 11 
Josh Donaldson 9 
Manny Machado 27 
Total 64 
 
 
 
Table 26: 2015 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Bryce Harper 13 
Paul Goldschmidt 4 
Joey Votto 7 
Anthony Rizzo 1 
Andrew McCutchen 2 
Total 27 
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Table 27: 2015 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Josh Donaldson 10 
Mike Trout 7 
Lorenzo Cain 3 
Manny Machado 52 
Nelson Cruz 18 
Total 90 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: 2018 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Christian Yelich 1 
Trevor Story 17 
Javier Baez 26 
Nolan Arenado 12 
Paul Goldschmidt 5 
Total 61 
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Table 29: 2018 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mike Trout 12 
Mookie Betts 2 
Jose Ramirez 24 
Alex Bregman 1 
J.D. Martinez 5 
Total 44 
 
 
 
Table 30: 2017 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Giancarlo Stanton 22 
Charlie Blackmon 7 
Joey Votto 5 
Kris Bryant 57 
Justin Turner 18 
Total 109 
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Table 31: 2017 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Jose Altuve 14 
Mike Trout 4 
Aaron Judge 69 
Jose Ramirez 64 
Carlos Correa 45 
Total 196 
 
 
 
 
Table 32: 2016 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Kris Bryant 55 
Corey Seager 47 
Daniel Murphy 20 
Freddie Freeman 33 
Jean Segura 30 
Total 185 
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Table 33: 2016 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mike Trout 2 
Jose Altuve 11 
Josh Donaldson 9 
Carlos Correa 20 
Mookie Betts 15 
Total 57 
 
 
 
 
Table 34: 2015 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Bryce Harper 13 
Joey Votto 7 
Paul Goldschmidt 4 
Andrew McCutchen 2 
AJ Pollock 21 
Total 47 
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Table 35: 2015 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking 
Player IMP Ranking 
Mike Trout 7 
Josh Donaldson 10 
Nelson Cruz 18 
Manny Machado 52 
Adam Eaton 15 
Total 102 
 
 
 
 
Table 36: Yearly IMP Totals 
 
Year 
Albert 
Pujols 
David 
Ortiz 
Carlos 
Beltran 
2002 0.855 0.735 0.894 
2003 0.925 0.928 0.862 
2004 0.963 0.889 0.980 
2005 0.831 1.269 0.798 
2006 1.361 1.136 1.098 
2007 0.980 0.838 0.773 
2008 1.036 0.765 0.981 
2009 1.117 0.777 0.935 
2010 0.898 0.822 0.721 
2011 0.895 0.736 0.771 
2012 0.894 0.948 0.831 
2013 0.751 0.798 0.656 
2014 0.740 0.949 0.713 
2015 0.550 0.741 0.706 
2016 0.815 0.888 0.739 
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Table 37: Yearly OPS Totals 
Year 
Albert 
Pujols 
David 
Ortiz 
Carlos 
Beltran 
2002 0.955 0.839 0.847 
2003 1.106 0.961 0.911 
2004 1.072 0.983 0.915 
2005 1.039 1.001 0.744 
2006 1.102 1.049 0.982 
2007 0.997 1.066 0.878 
2008 1.114 0.877 0.876 
2009 1.101 0.794 0.915 
2010 1.011 0.899 0.768 
2011 0.906 0.953 0.91 
2012 0.859 1.026 0.842 
2013 0.767 0.959 0.83 
2014 0.79 0.873 0.703 
2015 0.787 0.913 0.808 
2016 0.78 1.021 0.85 
 
 
 
Table 38: Yearly Clutchness Totals 
 
Year 
Albert 
Pujols 
David 
Ortiz 
Carlos 
Beltran 
2002 -0.35 -0.43 0.68 
2003 -1.02 0.36 -0.54 
2004 -0.33 -0.18 0.65 
2005 -1.64 3.31 0.8 
2006 3.26 1.48 1.49 
2007 0.38 -1.68 -0.79 
2008 -0.17 -0.76 1.17 
2009 0.67 0.27 0.37 
2010 -0.69 -0.22 -0.25 
2011 0.37 -1.61 -0.89 
2012 0.88 -0.13 0.33 
2013 0.25 -1.08 -1.08 
2014 -0.01 1.23 0.47 
2015 -1.87 -1.16 -0.47 
2016 0.81 -0.66 -0.38 
 
